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Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Comment 
By JAMES C. COX, VERNON L. SMITH, AND JAMES M. WALKER* 
Glenn Harrison's (1989) critique of our 
research on first-price auctions is based on 
his premise that it is "more natural" to test 
hypotheses about bidding behavior with data 
on monetary payoffs (to the experimental 
subjects) rather than with the bid data that 
we used. His reconsideration of (a small 
part of) the evidence is implemented with 
tests of the risk-neutral bidding model that 
use three "metrics" of forgone expected 
payoffs. In Section I below, we explain that 
Harrison's metric approach to testing be- 
havioral hypotheses with payoff data is based 
on an implicit assumption of unique cardi- 
nal utility. Without unique cardinal utility, 
calculations with his metrics yield results of 
arbitrary magnitude. 
Although measures of forgone payoffs 
cannot provide metrics for testing hypothe- 
ses derived from utility theory, they can 
provide useful heuristics to aid in experi- 
mental design. However, Harrison's metrics 
do not provide useful heuristics for our auc- 
tion experiments, because they do not mea- 
sure forgone payoffs in informative ways. 
This is also explained in Section I. 
Harrison's concern with the motivational 
implications of subjects' monetary payoffs is 
a valid and widely shared concern among 
experimental economists. A major part of 
our research program has been devoted to 
exploring motivational questions. However, 
the critiques by Harrison (1989) and John 
Kagel and Alvin Roth (1992) create the 
impression that we have not examined moti- 
vational questions. In fact, our research 
program has provided and continues to pro- 
vide clear empirical evidence on the motiva- 
tion and opportunity-cost questions that 
Harrison attempted to address with his met- 
rics. This is explained in Section II. 
Kagel and Roth (1992) reformulate Har- 
rison's critique of our first-price auction re- 
search. In doing so, they implicitly reject 
both Harrison's metrics and his premise that 
it is "more natural" to test hypotheses about 
bidding behavior with payoff data rather 
than bid data. Kagel and Roth implicitly 
accept our explanation that it is necessary 
to examine bid data for evidence on the 
strength or weakness of subjects' motiva- 
tion, and they present some bid data that 
are relevant for testing risk-neutral bidding 
theory and its generalizations. However, 
Kagel and Roth make crucial errors in in- 
terpreting and applying both Harrison's 
critique and our bidding theory. As a 
consequence, their central conclusions are 
untenable. We explain this in Section III 
below. 
I. Harrison's Critique 
In deriving his "opportunity cost" for 
"misbehavior," Harrison (1989 p. 751) first 
reproduces the linear part of the Nash equi- 
librium bid function for the constant-rela- 
tive-risk-aversion model (CRRAM) that is 
derived in Cox, Bruce Roberson, and Smith 
(1982): 
N-i 
N - 1+ 
(l) bJ =- N-1+ rj;(i - ) 
In equation (1), b} is agent j's theoretically 
optimal bid, v; is agent j's independent 
private value for the auctioned object, 1- r 
is agent j's coefficient of constant relative 
risk aversion, N is the number of bidders in 
the auction, and v is the lower bound on 
the support of the uniform probability dis- 
tribution of auctioned object values. 
Harrison also reproduces the following 
expected-utility function from Cox, Rober- 
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son, and Smith (1982): 
(2 jUb) =~ YN-(bj _ V)N( _- 
where 
N - 1+ E(r) 
(3) y=( )T-v 
and where 1 - E(r) is the mean coefficient 
of constant relative risk aversion in the pop- 
ulation of bidders and T3 is the upper bound 
on the support of the uniform probability 
distribution of auctioned object values. 
Harrison (1989 p. 751) explains his use of 
equations (l)-(3) as follows: "The question 
considered here, however, is how U differs 
from U* as bi deviates from b>"` In other 
words, Harrison evaluates the expected-util- 
ity opportunity-cost function, 
(4) L (bj) = U(bj) - U(b)j* 
Harrison uses observed bids by experimen- 
tal subjects and theoretical bids for risk- 
neutral (r1 = 1) and risk-averse (rj = 0.7) 
agents to calculate the differences in his 
metrics. Specifically, his metric 1 calculates 
L(b1) using the assumptions that rj = 1, for j =1, 2,...,N, and E(r) =1. His metric 2 
calculates L(b1) using the assumptions that 
rj =1, for all j, and that E(r) = 0.7. In his 
table 3, Harrison extends his series of met- 
rics to include the case in which rj= 0.7, for 
all j, and E(r) = 0.7.1 
Harrison reports only the median values 
of these calculated figures and ignores all 
other data. On the basis of these medians, 
Harrison concludes that the expected-utility 
differences are small and suggests that we 
were wrong in rejecting the risk-neutral 
model. However, as is well known, ex- 
pected-utility theory does not attach any 
meaning either to comparisons of prefer- 
ence differences or to any particular cardi- 
nal measure ("metric") of utility.2 
First consider difference comparisons. 
Expected-utility functions are derived from 
binary relations over pairs of prospects, not 
quaternary relations over pairs of pairs (or 
differences) of prospects. Thus the numeri- 
cal difference between two expected-utility 
numbers does not measure preference dif- 
ference. There do exist preference axioms 
for which preference differences are mean- 
ingful. Furthermore, one can find in the 
literature a version of difference prefer- 
ences that can be represented by a function 
U&() that has the (expected-utility) func- 
tional form of linearity in the probabilities 
(Rakesh Sarin, 1982). However, that ap- 
proach would not salvage Harrison's metrics 
because the "utility" function U(*) would 
still only be unique up to a positive affine 
transformation. Thus, if U&() represents 
difference preferences, then so does a + 
,BU( ), for any a and any positive p. There- 
fore, a difference-preference opportunity- 
cost function would be correctly written as 
(5) L(bj) =-1 [U(bj)-U(bj)]* 
However, f is a positive number of arbi- 
trary magnitude. Hence, it is not possible to 
use (5) to make any valid statement that 
some L(bO) is "small." In order to make 
such a statement, one needs unique cardi- 
nal utility. Furthermore, since Harrison 
(1989 table 3) applies his metrics to data for 
groups of subjects, he requires cardinal util- 
ity that is interpersonally comparable. 
Harrison (1989 p. 761) goes beyond apply- 
ing his utility metrics to data from bidding 
1Note that the calculation of Harrison's metrics 
places specific inconsistent requirements on the risk 
characteristics of bidders. In metric 2, where rj = 1, for 
all j, and E(r) = 0.7, Harrison has devised a set of 
conditions which, given his use, violate the conditions 
of the Nash model. He pools bid data across all indi- 
viduals within an experiment and across experiments. 
From his "metric," it would follow that all individuals 
are risk-neutral and yet they believe that all competi- 
tors are risk-averse. Clearly, this is an assumption that 
is inconsistent with the requirements of a Nash equilib- 
rium. 
2Explanations of these properties of expected-utility 
theory are widely available. The most accessible exposi- 
tions are in textbooks such as Hal Varian (1984) and 
David Kreps (1990). 
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experiments and ends his article with the 
following methodological statement: "In 
principle the experimental method has an 
advantage over other empirical techniques 
if one can design controlled experiments 
that induce subjects' utility functions. In this 
case the experimentalist can say just 'how 
large' the discrepancies are between ob- 
served and predicted behavior in a natural 
metric from the perspective of theory." 
Actually, the advantage of experimental 
methods over other techniques does not de- 
pend in any way on one's ability to induce 
subjects' unique cardinal utility in the sense 
of being able to say "how large" is the 
utility of discrepancies between observed 
and predicted behavior. Experimentalists 
have not found a miraculous way to cardi- 
nalize ordinal utility uniquely, and-except 
for Harrison-have made no such claim. 
The substance of Harrison's argument is 
that one cannot reject the hypothesis of 
risk-neutral bidding behavior in the experi- 
ments he analyzes when one uses his met- 
rics to measure the importance of expected 
forgone payoffs. Harrison's behavioral hy- 
pothesis test does require a unique cardinal 
utility interpretation for the following rea- 
sons: (a) payoffs (and forgone payoffs) are 
worth considering only if the subjects care 
about them; and (b) Harrison's test involves 
specific assumptions about how much the 
subjects care about forgone payoffs of any 
given size. Harrison's formula for a behav- 
ioral hypothesis test embodies the specific 
cardinal utility function (or "metric") that is 
tested with the payoff data. 
Although measures of forgone payoffs are 
not useful for testing behavioral hypotheses, 
they can provide useful heuristics to aid in 
experimental design.3 However, Harrison's 
metric calculations are not useful for this 
purpose because he only reports median 
values and ignores the rest of the data. 
Median forgone payoffs are associated with 
median bids; but median bids have very 
small (Nash equilibrium) ex ante calculated 
probabilities of winning in a first-price auc- 
tion in which only the highest bid can win. 
These low probabilities are the reason why 
Harrison's metric calculations yield such 
"small" numbers. Indeed, as noted by 
Daniel Friedman (1992 p. 1375): "... . Harri- 
son's reasoning would lead to the conclu- 
sion that subject misbehavior is 'statistically 
negligible' even when four or more subjects 
all bid randomly between own valuation 
and zero. ...The underlying problem is that 
Harrison's statistical procedures can hide 
many large losses under more numerous 
small losses." Friedman proceeds to intro- 
duce a measure of forgone payoffs that, 
unlike Harrison's, may be a useful heuristic 
to aid in experimental design. 
The hypothesis tests that originally led us 
to reject the risk-neutral model do not use 
median bids. Instead, the tests in Cox, 
Roberson, and Smith (1982) use market 
prices, that is, only the highest bids. Thus, 
we found that winning bids were signifi- 
cantly greater than those predicted by the 
risk-neutral model. We also found signifi- 
cant differences across winning bidders in 
their bid:value ratios. These results are in- 
consistent with both the risk-neutral model 
and the models in which bidders are as- 
sumed to all have the same risk-averse pref- 
erences. This led us to construct the first 
heterogeneous-bidders model, CRRAM, 
before analyzing individual bidding data. 
II. Our Investigations of Subject Motivation 
Our critique (and those of Friedman 
[1992] and Kagel and Roth [1992]) of Harri- 3Harrison's critique may suggest to the reader that 
the salient monetary payoffs in our experiments were 
insignificant. However, examination of our data-reveals 
the following. Define PRN as the profits from theoreti- 
cal risk-neutral bidding. Define PA as the actual sub- 
jects' profits in an experiment. Then CA = PRN - PA 
measures the actual forgone payoff from higher than 
risk-neutral bidding. What are the CA values in our 
experiments? The series-4 experiments in Cox et al. 
(1988) have average values of PRN = $48.42 and PA= 
$22.48. Thus, if these subjects were actually risk-neu- 
tral then the payoff loss (CA) from nonoptimal bidding 
in the series-4 experiments would on average exceed 
$25 per experiment. The five-bidder, 20-period 
enhanced-payoff experiment in Cox et al. (1988) has 
PRN = $119.28 and PA = $42.30; that is, CA = $76.98. 
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son (1989) should not be construed to imply 
that experimental economists can ignore 
questions about subject payoffs in designing 
their experiments. In fact, experimental 
economists and experimental psychologists 
have, for decades, been concerned with the 
relation between monetary payoffs and sub- 
ject motivation. Sidney Siegel and Lawrence 
Fouraker (1960) examined the effect of in- 
creasing the differences in payoffs between 
the predicted (Pareto-optimal) quantity out- 
come and two adjacent discrete quantity 
outcomes in bargaining experiments. Their 
results showed a substantial decrease in the 
variance of outcomes with increased for- 
gone payoff, but the predictions of the the- 
ory were supported under both payoff con- 
ditions. Other studies such as Siegel (1961), 
Fouraker and Siegel (1963), Morris Fiorina 
and Charles Plott (1978), David Grether 
and Plott (1979), Grether (1980, 1981), Cox 
et al. (1983a,b, 1984, 1985b, 1988), and 
Detlof von Winterfeldt and Ward Edwards 
(1986), have examined the effects of chang- 
ing payoff differences on subjects' behavior. 
A large part of our research program on 
auctions has been devoted to exploring 
questions of subject motivation. This part of 
our research program has been extensive, 
partly because the nonunique measurement 
properties of preference theory require that 
we examine decisions in message (or bid) 
space for evidence on the strength or weak- 
ness of motivation. We have used two ap- 
proaches to study the relation between sub- 
jects' behavior and monetary payoffs. One 
of these involves the introduction of mone- 
tary payoff transformations as experimental 
treatments and observations of whether be- 
havior changes as a result. The, other ap- 
proach consists of the development and 
testing of new bidding models in response 
to various anomalies arising in tests of 
CRRAM. Some of these models incorpo- 
rate such things as income thresholds, utility 
(of the event) of winning the auction, and 
other nonstandard motivational assump- 
tions. It cannot be overemphasized that, 
if forgone payoff makes a difference in sub- 
ject decisions (and we believe that it can 
and does), this necessarily implies that 
decision-makers are motivated by other 
things besides monetary rewards. This fol- 
lows because standard theory predicts that 
decision-makers will choose so as to maxi- 
mize their gain however flat is the payoff hill. 
Consequently, as has been emphasized re- 
peatedly in the past (Siegel, 1961; Smith, 
1976, 1982), other things in the utility func- 
tion are keys not only to understanding mo- 
tivation from the perspective of the subject, 
but also to obtaining a theoretical treatment 
of the intuition that forgone payoff matters. 
By ignoring the long experimental history of 
these considerations, Harrison's empirically 
justified concern with payoff motivation fails 
to provide any new insights. 
A. Experiments with Payoff 
Transformations 
Our research program on auctions has 
examined the effects of payoff transforma- 
tions as experimental treatments. We used 
such transformations to obtain empirical ev- 
idence on subject motivation and in con- 
structing alternative tests of CRRAM. We 
have used multiplicative transformations, 
power-function transformations, and 
stochastic (or lottery payoff) transforma- 
tions. Our experiments with multiplicative 
transformations long ago provided theoreti- 
cally meaningful evidence on the motiva- 
tional questions that Harrison attempted to 
analyze with his metrics. The nature of this 
evidence can be understood from the fol- 
lowing. 
As in Section I above, let v; be the in- 
duced (monetary) value of the auctioned 
object for agent j. Let bj be the (monetary 
amount of agent j's bid. If b1 is the winning 
bid, then agent j receives the monetary 
payoff, vj - bj. With CRRAM as the main- 
tained hypothesis, the utility to agent j of 
bidding bj can be represented by the 
expected-utility function in equation (2) 
above. Now rewrite equation (2) as 
(6) U(bj) = a 
+ fYN l(bj- V)N l(v -b )rj 
for arbitrary a and any positive f. State- 
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ment (6) drops the normalization (a, f) = 
(0,1), which is contained in statement (2), to 
make it clear that the results in the follow- 
ing discussion are invariant o positive affine 
transformations of utility functions. 
Experiments with multiplicative transfor- 
mations of payoffs are conducted as follows. 
Instead of paying a winning bidder vj - bj 
dollars, we pay him or her A(vj - bj) dollars. 
We then vary A and observe whether the 
subjects' bidding behavior changes. With 
CRRAM as the maintained hypothesis, it is 
easy to understand the questions that are 
addressed with this payoff treatment. 
With the multiplicative-payoff treatment, 
expected-utility function (6) can be rewrit- 
ten as4 
(7) UA(bj) = a 
+ f,yN-l(bj - V)N-1[A(Vj-bj)] 
Statements (6) and (7) imply 
(8) UA(bj) = AriU (bj). 
Now assume that we are modeling differ- 
ence preferences [replace U(*) with U()] 
as in Sarin (1982). Then, preference inter- 
pretations are defined for 
(9) UA'(bj) = AriUC(bj) 
and 
(10) OA(bj)-UCA(bj) 
Ari [U(bj* )C-(bj)]. 
Note that the multiplicative payoff treat- 
ment has three related effects. Increasing A 
provides a scale increase in subjects' mone- 
tary payoffs. Statement (9) shows that 
increasing A increases the curvature of 
expected "utility" functions and thus ad- 
dresses the "flat-maximum" property dis- 
cussed by Harrison (1989). Alternatively, 
statement (10) shows that increasing A pro- 
vides a scale increase in the forgone ex- 
pected "utility" from any given bid devia- 
tion, b7 - b1. Finally note that statement (8) 
indicates that CRRAM predicts that varying 
A will have no effect on bids (if bj* equates 
the first derivative to zero for any A > 0, it 
does so for all A > 0). In fact, one can show 
that power-function (or log-linear) utility is 
necessary for this invariance; hence, the 
multiplicative-transformation treatment dis- 
criminates between CRRAM and other 
models. 
We reported experiments in which A was 
increased from 1 to 3 in Cox, Smith, and 
Walker (hereafter CSW) (1983a, b, 1984, 
1985b, 1988). Experiments in which A is 
increased from zero to as high as 20 are 
reported in Smith and Walker (1992b). All 
of these experiments produced auction mar- 
ket prices and individual subjects' bids that 
are significantly greater than risk-neutral 
ones. The earlier (A = 1,3) experiments re- 
vealed no significant effect on bids from 
changing A. The later experiments with 
higher values of A revealed insignificant ef- 
fects on bids, in the direction of further 
movement above risk-neutral bids (Smith 
and Walker, 1992b). 
Thus our research program had previ- 
ously provided an empirical answer to the 
(empirical) question that Harrison at- 
tempted to address with his metric calcula- 
tions. The answer was that low opportunity 
cost, or low expected-utility-function curva- 
ture ("flat maxima"), did not explain the 
consistent tendency of subjects to bid in 
excess of risk-neutral bids. 
If low opportunity cost cannot explain 
higher-than-risk-neutral bids, then what 
can? Bidder risk aversion is one explana- 
tion, since Nash equilibrium bidding theory 
predicts that a risk-averse bidder will bid 
more than a risk-neutral bidder in a first- 
price buyers' auction. 
4The term yN- l(bj - V)N-1 is the probability that 
agent j's bid is the winning bid if all of his or her rivals 
bid according to the CRRAM equilibrium bid function 
in statement (1). Statement (8) implies that agent j's 
optimal bid in the presence of the multiplicative payoff 
transformation is given by statement (1) if G(b) = 
yN-l(bj - V)N-1. Therefore, bid function (1) has the 
Nash equilibrium best-reply property for all positive 
values of A. An alternative (longer but more rigorous) 
derivation of this result would follow the logic of the 
derivation in Cox, Smith, and Walker (1982). 
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When we began our research program on 
auctions, the only available Nash-equi- 
librium alternative to the risk-neutral model 
was the identical-bidders concave (risk- 
averse or risk-neutral) model developed by 
Charles Holt (1980), John Riley and William 
Samuelson (1981), and Milton Harris and 
Artur Raviv (1981). Early in our research 
program, however, we found significant dif- 
ferences among the bid-value relationships 
for individual bidders, a result that is incon- 
sistent with the identical-bidders concave 
model. As a response to these falsifying 
observations, we developed a heteroge- 
neous-bidders model, CRRAM, as an alter- 
native generalization of the risk-neutral 
model (CSW, 1982). We subsequently devel- 
oped the log-concave model as a generaliza- 
tion of the risk-neutral model, the identical- 
bidders concave model, and CRRAM (CSW, 
1988). 
Although CRRAM does a surprisingly 
good job (for a parametric model) in orga- 
nizing the data from first-price auctions, 
there are several tests that are inconsistent 
with it (CSW, 1984, 1985b, 1988).5 Most of 
these CRRAM-inconsistent observations 
are consistent with the log-concave model; 
but some of these observations appear to be 
related to questions about subjects' motiva- 
tion and preferences. As a response, we 
developed and tested bidding models 
specifically designed to study these ques- 
tions. 
B. Bidding Models with Nonstandard 
Motivation and Preference Hypotheses 
We have introduced bidding models that 
incorporate systematic violations of Bayes' 
rule (CSW, 1983b), nonlinear subjective ex- 
pected values (CSW, 1985b), utility of the 
(event of) winning the auction (CSW, 1983b, 
1988), and income-threshold utility (CSW, 
1988). In each case, development of the new 
model was a response to observations of 
bidding behavior by some subjects that could 
not be rationalized by bidding models based 
on standard hypotheses. Each model has 
testable implications, and we designed many 
experiments to test them. The interested 
reader is directed to our cited papers for a 
complete development. We will here review 
one of our models that was developed 
specifically for investigating the motiva- 
tional implications of subjects' payoffs. 
We explained above that we developed 
the CRRAM and log-concave models in 
order to provide equilibrium bidding mod- 
els that are consistent with the robust 
tendency of subjects' bids to (a) exceed 
risk-neutral theoretical bids and (b) exhibit 
heterogeneous (across subjects) bid/value 
relationships. CRRAM attributes higher 
than risk-neutral bids to risk aversion. In 
contrast, the general M-parameter log-con- 
cave model can attribute such bids to risk 
aversion or any other bidder characteristics 
that are consistent with log-concavity and 
M-parameter representability. Early in our 
research program, we also developed alter- 
native (to CRRAM) specific models that 
attribute high bids to utility of (the event of) 
winning the auction rather than to risk aver- 
sion. One such model was introduced in 
Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982) and tested 
in CSW (1983b). 
One of the models that we developed in 
CSW (1988) was the parametric model that 
we dubbed CRRAM*. It is a testable model 
that (a) provides an alternative (to risk aver- 
sion) explanation of higher than risk-neutral 
bidding and (b) is consistent with the 
"throwaway bid" phenomenon. CRRAM* 
attributes higher than risk-neutral bids to 
risk aversion or utility of the event of win- 
ning the auction (as distinct from utility of 
the monetary payoff from winning). This 
model attributes "throwaway bids" to sub- 
ject preferences that exhibit income thresh- 
olds. 
What are "throwaway bids"? Some sub- 
jects in first-price auction experiments, upon 
drawing a low value from a discrete uniform 
distribution, enter a bid at (or near) zero, or 
less frequently bid at, near, or even (inten- 
tionally) above value. Our interpretation 
from the beginning has been that at low 
values (below 20 percent of maximum value, 
or $2 on a scale of $10) this minority of 
5Some further anomalies result when CRRAM is 
extended to multiunit discriminative auctions (CSW, 
1984, 1985a). 
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subjects simply do not take the auction seri- 
ously. They are unlikely to win or lose much 
in any case, so they may bid lower or higher 
relative to value than when they receive 
values above this cut-off point. We present 
examples of such behavior in CSW (1988). 
Of course, low values will occur, but stan- 
dard models predict that subjects will bid 
the same, relative to value, right down to 
values near zero. Although a large majority 
of subjects in fact do this, a minority do not. 
In these cases it is obvious that the theory 
must be generalized to account for the 
broader range of observed demand behavior 
than can be predicted from standard mod- 
els. Accordingly, we hypothesized (CSW, 
1988 pp. 90-4) that, for some subjects, there 
were two special utility effects: (a) a utility 
of winning, parameterized by wj 2 0, which 
is distinct from the utility of monetary pay- 
off; and (b) a threshold income, parameter- 
ized by tj2 0, below which a utility loss 
occurs. In CRRAM*, utility can be written 
in the CRRA form: 
(11) uj(vj -bj +wj- tj) 
_v j - b.+ w wj - tj 0 
(vj -bj + wj -tj)i for vj-bj+wj-tj20. 
for v, - bi. + wj- tj ? 0. 
The derivation of a Nash equilibrium bid 
function would require agents to form ex- 
pectations on the new parameters (wi, ti) in 
addition to ri for all of their rivals. The 
resulting model is not tractable (except by 
numerical methods). However, if agent j 
believes that all i # j will bid bi = fBivi, 
where 1/I3i has the cumulative density 
function 1D(1/13) on (1, N/[N - 1]), then the 
optimal bid rule for j is 
O for v + w 
-tj <0 
(12) bj N l 
for v + w- tj2 0. 
Hence, if wj - tj > 0, the bid function has a 
positive intercept, and if wI - t < 0, the bid 
function predicts zero bids for values less 
than the threshold, t - w . 
A procedure, such as tie one articulated 
above, is an appropriate way to proceed 
when subjects reveal via their message 
choices that their motivation diverges from 
that postulated by the original model. The 
new bid-prediction equation (12) is testable. 
We have designed experiments in which we 
add a lump-sum reward, wj, for winning to 
the cash reward, vj - bj, or alternatively 
deduct a lump-sum fee, tj, from the reward, 
v; - bj, when i wins the auction. We do this 
in an environment in which we control for 
the parameters (wi, ti), for i # j, by using 
robot (simulated) bidders, as explained in 
Walker et al. (1987). The robots use the bid 
function bi = J3ivi. In some experiments pi 
is the slope of the risk-neutral bid function, 
(N - 1)/N, whereas in other experiments 
T3i is randomly drawn from the sample of 
estimates, 6i, for all previous human sub- 
jects. In CSW (1988), we report tests of the 
predictive consequences of CRRAM*, 
namely, that when wj >0 and tj= 0, the 
intercept of the observed bid function will 
increase relative to the baseline, and when 
wJ = 0 and tj > 0, the intercept of the ob- 
served bid function will fall relative to the 
baseline. Overall, we find that 35 of 45 cases 
conform to the predictions of CRRAM*. 
Our development and testing of 
CRRAM* provides an example of how 
message-space observations that suggest 
subject characteristics that are not in stan- 
dard theory can be studied in an internally 
consistent research program. This approach 
is in sharp contrast to that followed by 
Harrison. In implementing what he believes 
are the implications of his 1989 paper, Har- 
rison has adopted the practice of testing 
theories by applying informal notions of 
"perceptive thresholds" to calculations of 
expected incomes. Consider, for example, 
the search experiments reported in Harri- 
son and Peter Morgan (1990). They begin 
with predictions of several search models 
that do not include income thresholds. Ex- 
periments are then carried out to test the 
predictions of these standard models. How- 
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ever, in analyzing the data the predictions 
of informal threshold models are substi- 
tuted for the predictions of the formal mod- 
els. Harrison and Morgan (1990 p. 483) ex- 
plain their procedure as follows: "We now 
consider how close the subjects came to the 
theoretically optimal search strategy for 
each problem. ...To give a meaningful re- 
sponse, we pose this question: how poor do 
our subjects' perceptual abilities need to be 
in order to reconcile the observed and theo- 
retically predicted behaviours?" The prob- 
lems with this informal approach to theory 
modification are apparent. The predictions 
of the formal search models are, in fact, not 
tested. The informal modifications of the 
models that are tested are based on an 
implicit assumption that income or percep- 
tual thresholds produce additive differences 
in the predictions of search models. How- 
ever, search models with thresholds have 
not been developed, and there is no reason 
to believe that their predictions would con- 
sist of additive deviations from the search 
models without thresholds. Hence, what one 
has in Harrison and Morgan (1990) is simply 
a method of data analysis that is inappropri- 
ate for drawing any conclusions about the 
search models that are ostensibly being 
tested. 
III. Kagel and Roth's Critique 
Kagel and Roth (1992) argue that we 
attribute "overbidding" (meaning higher 
than risk-neutral bidding) entirely, to risk 
aversion. They also assert (p. 1379) that 
...data inconsistent with risk-averse bid- 
ding are largely ignored in CSW (1988)." 
These allegations are false, because in CSW 
(1988) we develop and test a model that 
provides an alternative explanation of over- 
bidding; it is the utility-of-winning model 
described in Section II above, which was 
directly motivated by anomalies we ob- 
served in testing CRRAM. Kagel and Roth 
also claim (p. 1380) that "...behavior satis- 
fies CSW's theory when no change is re- 
quired, but does not satisfy it when exten- 
sive changes are required... ." This conclu- 
sion apparently reflects their belief that: (a) 
the data they present in their section III are 
inconsistent with our theory; and (b) we 
have not conducted tests that require ad- 
justments in behavior to satisfy the theory. 
In fact, Kagel and Roth's data analysis con- 
tains several crucial errors; this is explained 
below. Furthermore, we have presented re- 
sults from experiments that require adjust- 
ments in behavior to satisfy the theory in 
five of our published papers; the references 
and a partial listing of the many experimen- 
tal treatments are also given below. In the 
following subsections, we will respond to 
the comments in sections I-III in the Kagel 
and Roth (hereafter KR) paper. 
A. KR's Section I 
KR begin their Section I with a descrip- 
tion of Harrison's metric calculations and 
reassert the conclusions that Harrison states 
about the experiments that he analyzes. We 
have already explained in Section I why the 
metrics cannot be used to test behavioral 
hypotheses. Friedman (1992) has explained 
why Harrison's metrics do not provide use- 
ful heuristics to aid in experimental design; 
but we are puzzled by KR's acceptance of 
Harrison's critique, as we will now explain. 
Harrison's critique is based on his metric 
calculations with median bids. Our original 
tests that lead to rejection of the risk- 
neutral model used market prices, that is, 
only the highest bids (Cox, Roberson, and 
Smith, 1982). Further evidence that the 
highest bids consistently exceed those pre- 
dicted by the risk-neutral model is pre- 
sented in CSW (1988 pp. 69-71). It seems 
very strange that KR, at this point in their 
argument, accept Harrison's utility-metric 
evaluation of median bids, and reject our 
message-space evaluation of the highest 
bids, when in the balance of this section of 
their paper they excoriate us for the claimed 
sin of not using high bids. 
KR (1992 p. 1381) assert that our 
"...investigation of CRRAM is based on 
private valuations for which the expected 
cost of deviating from equilibrium is the 
lowest." This is said to follow from the fact 
that "... as much as 25 percent of the pri- 
vate valuations drawn could be excluded in 
the analysis of CRRAM bid functions..." 
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and to imply that " . .. Harrison's critique 
applies with special force to the CRRAM 
model." These statements simply reflect 
KR's misunderstanding of CRRAM, as we 
will now explain. 
KR support their statements by claiming 
that the highest 25 perce'nt of values and 
associated bids would be excluded when 
values are drawn from [$0.01, $10.00] and 
there are four bidders. Our Figure 1 shows 
the CRRAM risk-neutral (ri = 1) bid func- 
tion for the N = 4 bidders case and KR's 
correct identification of b* (the highest bid 
of a risk-neutral bidder) as $7.50. It also 
shows the CRRAM risk-averse bid function 
for ri = 0.75. KR assert that the ui between 
$7.50 and $10.00 would not be used in esti- 
mation of the linear part of the bid func- 
tions. In fact, only the vi betwee'n $9.38 and 
$10.00 would not be used in estimating the 
linear part of the ri = 0.75 bid function. 
In general, if the most risk-tolerant bid- 
der is risk-neutral, then all values less than 
or equal to (N - 1 + ri)T IN would be used 
in estimating the linear part of the CRRAM 
bid function for the bidder with risk-aver- 
sion parameter rid6 We have previously ex- 
plained the correct procedure for use of the 
data in CSW (1988 table 4) and in Walker 
et al. (1987 p. 241; 1990 p. 12, footnote 3, 
and tables 1, 2, and 4). That explanation 
immediately implies the following: if values 
are drawn from the uniform distribution on 
[0,u] and the most risk-tolerant individual 
has risk parameter r, then the percentage 
of observations excluded from the linear 
part of the bid function for bidder i is 
(13) v100 N-1+rri 
r - r 
=100 
N -1 + r 
For the case considered by KR (N = 4, 
T = $10.00), 12.5 percent of the observations 
would be excluded if the revealed values of 
ri were uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Of 
course, the revealed values of ri are not so 
distributed and, as a result, fewer observa- 
tions are excluded from the linear part. For 
the N = 4 experiments reported in Walker 
et al. (1990 table 2), 5.7 percent of the 
observations were excluded. With the N > 4 
experiments (reported in our other papers) 
a smaller percentage of the observations 
were excluded because the risk-neutral and 
risk-averse bid functions move closer to- 
gether as N increases. Furthermore, when- 
ever some of our observations were ex- 
cluded (as required by the theory) in 
estimating linear bid functions, we reesti- 
mated them with all of the data as a heuris- 
tic check on whether the estimates of the 
slope parameters (N - 1)/(N- 1 + ri) and, 
hence, of the risk-aversion parameters ri 
were affected in any notable way. They were 
not so affected. Cox and Ronald Oaxaca 
6Let auctioned-object values be drawn from the 
uniform distribution on [0,v] and let r be the coeffi- 
cient of constant relative risk aversion for the least 
risk-averse (or most risk-preferring) individual in the 
population. Then, the CRRAM equilibrium bid func- 
tion has a linear part, bi = (N - 1)vi /(N - 1 + rl), and 
a nonlinear part that does not have a simple closed 
form (CSW, 1982). The linear part applies to vi < (N - 1 + ri)T /(N - 1 + F), and the nonlinear part holds 
for larger values. 
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(1992) develop and apply a spline-function 
technique that uses all of the data in CSW 
(1988) to estimate the parameters of both 
parts of CRRAM bid functions. The re- 
sults indicate that CRRAM organizes all 
of the data quite well. This finding provides 
yet further evidence of the error in KR's 
claim that exclusion of data implies that 
Harrison's critique applies with special force 
to CRRAM. 
In our nonparametric test of the disputed 
risk-neutral special case of CRRAM, we do 
not exclude any of the bid data (CSW, 1988 
pp. 70-2). Some observations were excluded 
only when we estimated the parameters of 
the linear part of CRRAM bid functions. 
Furthermore, in most of our pre-1988 pa- 
pers the analysis was based solely on auc- 
tion market prices (i.e., only the highest 
bids). Therefore, KR's assertion that our 
analysis of bid data uses only bids by the 
least-motivated subjects is false. 
We now turn our attention to KR's table 
1 and their accompanying discussion. They 
report mean proportionate absolute bid de- 
viations (from risk-neutral bids) for the low- 
est, middle, and highest 20 percent of the 
bids. They observe that there appears to be 
an inverse relationship between vi and their 
mean-deviation measure and conclude that 
this provides support for their reformula- 
tion of Harrison's critique. However, the 
fact that the proportionate bid deviations 
are somewhat lower in the highest 20 per- 
cent of the values than in the middle 20 
percent of the values is consistent with a 
concave nonlinear upper segment for the 
CRRAM bid function (see Fig. 1). These 
observations support (rather than violate) 
CRRAM, and KR are to be commended for 
proposing this test. The comparison be- 
tween the lowest and the middle 20-percent 
figures is inconsistent with CRRAM and all 
other bidding models based on standard 
assumptions. This reflects the "throwaway" 
bid and utility-of-winning phenomena that 
we (CSW, 1988 pp. 77-8) and other experi- 
mentalists, have previously reported. In fact, 
we have not only reported the phenomena, 
but also have extended bidding theory to 
accommodate them and then tested the ex- 
tended theory (CSW, 1988 pp. 90-6);7 see 
Section II, above. 
B. KR's Section II 
This section again incorrectly imputes to 
us the position that risk aversion is the only 
factor in bidding above the risk-neutral Nash 
equilibrium (RNNE) bid function. Now the 
evidence that is provided to dispute this 
''straw man" is in the form of bidding in 
excess of value in dominant-strategy auc- 
tions, where risk aversion is not a factor. 
This is a phenomenon on which we have 
reported extensively in CSW (1985a). (We 
have reported experiments both with and 
without a restriction on bidding above 
value.) Again, as in first-price auctions, this 
anomaly could be addressed with a utility- 
of-winning model (or a decision-cost model 
as in Smith and Walker [1992a]). Of particu- 
lar interest would be the introduction of a 
utility of winning in first-, second-, and 
third-price auctions with the objective of 
getting a stronger test of this hypothesis 
than we were able to construct for first-price 
auctions alone. (We have proposed this ex- 
tension to Kagel and Dan Levin for their 
interesting working paper [Kagel and Levin, 
1988].) 
71n Smith and Walker (1992a), based on a simple 
effort-cost model of decision-making, it is shown that 
dVarEj(t) 
dvj(t) 
where VarEj(t) is the variance of individual j's bid in 
auction t relative to the CRRAM risk-averse optimal 
bid, b*(t), given by (1) when value is vj(t). Thus, 
independently of any income-threshold phenomena, 
individual error variance around bj*(t) declines with 
higher values for given A. This is because, in the 
model, the higher expected utility when values are 
higher results in increased opportunity cost of a nonop- 
timal decision; thus, more decision effort is expended, 
and decision error is reduced. Consequently, propor- 
tional bid deviations from the RNNE are predicted to 
decline with value in KR's table 1 for the linear portion 
of the CRRAM bid function. (Joyce Berg and John 
Dickhaut [1990] also use an error-incentives model to 
account for the preference-reversal phenomenon.) 
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Next, KR challenge our interpretation of 
bidding above RNNE when the risk-neutral- 
izing lottery procedure is used to pay sub- 
jects. First, it should be noted that this was 
a joint test of CRRAM and the lottery 
procedure. Second, we carefully screened 
subjects so that they were especially consis- 
tent with CRRAM (insignificant intercepts, 
high R2) as a means of giving the lottery 
procedure its best shot. The results were 
quite decisive and very disappointing for the 
lottery procedure, so we next went with 
inexperienced subjects. They did better, with 
50 percent of the subjects bidding in a way 
that was not significantly different from 
RNNE; this is, more than twice the baseline 
number with monetary rewards (Walker 
et al., 1990 p. 15). Furthermore, those bid- 
ding as if they were risk-averse were shifted 
toward risk-neutrality. This compares fairly 
well with results reported by Thomas A. 
Rietz (1991) for inexperienced subjects. 
However, when we retested most of the 
subjects they did not stay relatively risk- 
neutralized, whereas with monetary rewards 
80 percent of the subjects remain stable 
when retested.8 In fact, many bid as if they 
are risk-preferring, an extremely rare occur- 
rence with monetary rewards. (To our 
knowledge no one else has retested subjects 
with the lottery procedure.) These treat- 
ment effects from the lottery procedure rel- 
ative to baseline suggest that the lottery 
procedure is in question, not CRRAM, 
which yielded more stable comparisons be- 
tween inexperienced and experienced sub- 
jects. 
What accounts for the deviant behavior 
induced by the lottery procedure? Since the 
lottery procedure adds an additional com- 
pounding of elementary gambles, and since 
there is independent evidence that the pre- 
dictive power of expected utility deterio- 
rates markedly with higher compounding of 
gambles (Colin Camerer and Teck-Hua Ho, 
1990), it is natural to suspect that what is 
failing when the lottery procedure is intro- 
duced is the compound-lottery axiom. KR 
argue (p. 1383) instead that "... these data 
are inconsistent with the risk-aversion hy- 
pothesis ... [because] ... for expected-utility 
maximizers the binary lottery technique must 
be capable of controlling risk preferences." 
KR's statements are inconsistent with the 
fact that expected-utility theory can be 
well-defined and empirically valid on a set 
of simpler gambles but fail empirically on a 
set of more complex gambles. (KR argue 
the untenable case that if utility theory fails 
on any part of the domain of gambles, it 
necessarily fails on all.) Literally, what fails 
is the conjunction of CRRAM with an addi- 
tional compounding of payoff uncertainty. 
We leave it at that for future experimenta- 
tion and examination, and for the reader to 
contemplate. We regret that the results were 
not more favorable to this procedure be- 
cause, if it did work, it would be without 
question an important experimental tool.9 
Roy Radner and Andrew Schotter (1989) 
tried the procedure in conjunction with their 
8Smith and Walker (1992b) vary experience through 
four levels with a relatively large sample (154 subject- 
experiments of 25 auctions each). Second and higher 
levels of experience increase the bid levels relative to 
inexperienced subjects, but not significantly by all mea- 
sures. 
9Roth (who has used the procedure extensively) has 
never, to our knowledge, tested the procedure; he has 
only applied it on the assumption that it would risk- 
neutralize subjects (see Roth and Michael W. K. 
Malouf [1979] and the references in KR to Roth's work 
in bargaining). Roth's introduction of the procedure 
(first proposed by Cedric Smith [1961]) to experimental 
bargaining was a very innovative contribution since it 
permitted the (utility) information conditions that are 
believed to underlie the Nash bargaining model to be 
satisfied. If Roth had conducted the experiments both 
with lottery payoffs and without them (e.g., with direct 
monetary rewards) he could have learned whether the 
lottery treatment made any difference. Since earlier 
work had used money, and Roth reports similar find- 
ings with the lottery procedure, one must suppose that 
the procedure has no treatment effects in the context 
of bargaining. This is in line with the sealed-bid bar- 
gaining result of Radner and Schotter (1989). When we 
introduced lotteries in first-price auctions they were 
employed under those conditions most favorable to 
CRRAM, not under the conditions for which we had 
reported that CRRAM fails (the multiple-unit discrim- 
inative auctions in CSW [1984]; significantly nonzero 
bid-function intercepts and the use of quadratic and 
square-root monetary transformations in CSW [1988]). 
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model of sealed-bid bargaining and found 
that it did not yield the predictions of risk- 
neutral bargainers. Rietz (1991) reports 
more favorable comparative results when he 
first "trains" subjects in second-price auc- 
tions using the procedure before exposing 
them to first-price auction rules (but note 
that Rietz does not permit bidding above 
value, which is a procedure that KR [1992 
p. 1382] criticize in our work). Rietz's sam- 
ples are very small and have not been repli- 
cated, but his procedures show promise and 
deserve further examination. For example, 
Rietz's procedure of not allowing bids above 
value (Rietz, 1991 p. 33) in both his 
first- and second-price auctions, with mone- 
tary and with lottery payoffs, may be crucial 
to his result (which is not a criticism). 
We have not conducted exercises compar- 
ing bids above RNNE with any of the other 
well-known methods for measuring risk 
aversion because of the extensive and ex- 
pensive study of this matter by W. V. Har- 
low (1988). He compared the following five 
instruments for individual (not pooled) 
measures of risk aversion using a large sam- 
ple of subjects: bid deviations from RNNE, 
choice between risky gambles, two psycho- 
logical survey tests, and a measure con- 
structed from a biochemical blood-sample 
test. These measures are significantly and 
positively correlated, showing that CRRAM 
"as if risk-averse" subjects are similarly 
risk-averse by other measures. Results from 
this research program are also reported in 
Harlow and Keith Brown (1990a, b). 
KR accuse us of a methodology that ex- 
hibits a strong prior belief in CRRAM-so 
strong that they allege that we are not sensi- 
tive to contrary evidence. Yet it is precisely 
the evidence contrary to CRRAM that led 
us to formulate two extensions of CRRAM 
and the generalized log-concave model 
(CSW, 1988). It is correct, however, for KR 
to maintain that their methodology and data 
analysis stand in sharp contrast with ours. 
We welcome the opportunity to continue 
their discussion of this contrast, and we will 
present our viewpoint under three heads. 
1. Data Analysis.-Throughout KR's pa- 
per and in almost all the auction work of 
Kagel (the exception is Kagel and Levin 
[1985]), data across individuals are pooled; 
data sets by individual are not analyzed and 
tested so that one can say something about 
distributions of individual decision-making 
characteristics relative to the predictions of 
a theory. However, propositions about indi- 
vidual behavior do not apply to distributions 
of individuals unless all individuals are 
identical. RNNE theory assumes that all 
individuals are identical. Thus, in first-price 
auctions, RNNE theory predicts not only 
that j will bid bj = (N - 1)vj /N, but that 
this is true for all j. Therefore, as in CSW 
(1988), we answer two priority questions: 
Do subjects bid as if they are all risk neu- 
tral? If not, do they bid differently from 
each other? We answer these questions with 
nonparametric tests of individual bid devia- 
tions from risk-neutral behavior and report 
data on distributions of these statistics 
across individuals (CSW, 1988 pp. 71-4). 
These tests do not assume the special prop- 
erties of CRRAM, which invites other more 
specific tests. As a result the reader can 
determine what proportion of the subjects 
deviate from RNNE strategies and in which 
direction (CSW, 1988 table 2) and whether 
the individuals in each experiment are bid- 
ding as if they use the same strategies or 
distinct strategies (CSW, 1988 table 3). Only 
after these tests are reported do we test the 
special properties of CRRAM. The remain- 
ing anomalies led us to explore theoretical 
variations on it. 
In contrast with our approach, KR's ta- 
bles 1-4 present pooled data, from which 
one cannot determine whether (a) most bid- 
ders are close to the RNNE strategy, but 
aggregate deviations are large because of a 
few outlying subjects, or (b) most bidders 
deviate from RNNE bidding. Indeed, the 
pooled data might have been close to the 
RNNE, with individuals bidding much 
higher than RNNE offsetting those bidding 
much lower. Proper analysis of individu- 
al data must allow for the possibility that 
observed bid deviations from the predic- 
tion are of the form di=b(v1,G1)-b*(vj), 
where the observed bid of j, b, depends not 
only on value vj, but on some individual 
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characteristic 0.. Consequently the distribu- 
tion of d1 depends upon the distribution of 
0. in the sample of bidders and not only on 
the distribution of vi. 
2. Perceptual Errors.-KR (1992) have no 
explanation of why we, they, Harrison, and 
others, all observe the well-documented de- 
viations of subject bids from the RNNE, 
other than to attribute it to "perceptual 
errors" (p. 1382) or "bidding errors ... of 
one sort or another" (p. 1384). These 
phrases provide neither a theory nor an 
explanation, but rather only names for the 
observed phenomenon. How do they pro- 
pose to model these perceptual errors? Why 
are perceptual errors always predominately 
positive? We have offered (CSW, 1982, 1988) 
a class of models that predict deviations 
from RNNE in terms of risk aversion (log- 
concave model and CRRAM) and models 
that predict them in terms of a utility of 
winning and threshold utilities (CRRAM* 
and CRRAM**). As we have documented, 
these modifications account for some but 
not all of the anomalies. 
3. Theory Modification in the Light of Ex- 
periment.-In our view, the function of 
empirical research is to motivate the modi- 
fication of theory in the light of evidence. 
Theories typically account for some tests 
but fail to account for others. Thus, both 
Newton's and Einstein's theories were "born 
refuted" in the sense that falsifying observa- 
tions existed when the theories were origi- 
nally constructed (Irme Lakatos, 1980 pp. 5, 
39). Newton's theory was not immediately 
abandoned simply because (as was known in 
1687) it was inconsistent with the observed 
orbit of the moon; it was, instead, replaced 
by relativity theory when the latter pro- 
duced a more progressive research program 
(Lakatos, 1980 Ch. 1). Relativity theory has 
not been abandoned in response to falsify- 
ing observations because of the absence to 
date of a substitute theory leading to a 
more progressive research program. 
In order to modify economic theory ap- 
propriately, one needs to know not only 
where the theory fails, but also where the 
theory does not fail. In this way one knows 
which predictive consequences of the theory 
need to be preserved and which need to be 
altered.10 Our judgment is that private-value 
auction theory is doing well enough relative 
to the data that it would be premature to 
replace it without further attempts to mod- 
ify it in testable ways so as to reduce the 
anomalous cases. As explained by Lakatos 
(1980 p. 35), "There is no falsification be- 
fore the emergence of a better theory." The 
choice is necessarily between better and 
worse theories, not between some specific 
theory and the void. KR want us to reject 
auction theory because-as with all theories 
-there are anomalies, but they are not 
offering us a coherent substitute theory. 
Our log-concave model (CSW, 1988) is 
consistent with a wide range of possible 
bidding patterns. The model allows bidders 
to differ from each other in any way that 
can be represented by a finite number of 
parameters. Thus, if Oi is the (M - 1)-vector 
of agent i's characteristics then agent i's 
utility of money income yi can be written as 
Ui(yj) = U(Yi, Oi). The curvature of u(yi, Oi) 
in yi is restricted only to be log-concave. 
Thus, bidders can be risk-averse, risk-neu- 
tral, or risk-preferring. Furthermore, a given 
bidder can be risk-averse for some gambles 
and risk-neutral or risk-preferring for oth- 
ers. If this model has a problem, it is that it 
is consistent with too much data; it is so 
general that it has few testable implications. 
However, it provides a general framework 
in which equilibrium bid functions are 
known to exist for more restrictive models 
with more testable implications. We have 
developed and tested some more restrictive 
models, including CRRAM. If KR do not 
approve of those models, then the log-con- 
cave model provides them with a general 
framework in which to search for alterna- 
tive formulations. 
1An example of this methodology is illustrated by 
Berg and Dickhaut (1990), who use an error-incentive 
model to show how decision error in the preference- 
reversal phenomenon is decreased when incentives 
are increased. They show empirically that, as incentive- 
induced forgone expected utility increases, error rates 
decrease. They also show that this modification of 
standard theory better accounts for the data than alter- 
native approaches that depart more fundamentally from 
preference theory. 
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C. KR's Section III 
KR (1992) analyze bid data from the 
first-price auction experiments reported in 
Douglas Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (hereafter 
DKL) (1989) and in Raymond C. Battalio, 
Carl A. Kogut, and Jack Meyer (hereafter 
BKM) (1990). KR (p. 1386) state that "The 
primary point of Harrison's (1989) paper is 
that ... bidders with lower resale values have 
sharply reduced financial incentives....." KR 
(p. 1386) argue that this "primary point" is 
illustrated by data from the DKL experi- 
ment which shows that some bidders with 
relatively low resale values may bid zero, 
full resale value, or even more than full 
resale value. We do not agree with KR's 
assertion of Harrison's "primary point." We 
do agree that some subjects bid differently 
when they receive resale values from the 
low end of the support of a known distribu- 
tion than when they receive higher resale 
values. We documented such behavior in 
CSW (1988) under the rubric, "the throw- 
away bid phenomenon." More importantly, 
as explained in Subsection II-B above, we 
extended bidding theory to accomodate this 
type of behavior and then tested the ex- 
tended theory in CSW (1988). 
The DKL and BKM experiments differ 
from Harrison's experiments by using larger 
values for v (the highest possible induced 
value) while keeping v (the lowest possible 
induced value) approximately the same (KR, 
1992 p. 1384 and table 1). The implication 
of this procedure for bidder opportunity 
costs can be understood by substituting from 
our equation (3) into (6) and then finding 
the expression for the difference, 
(14) U(bj* )-(bj) 
[ I ~~N-1 
(N - 1)( - v) ) 
X (bj* - )N1( _-b* )r 
_-(bj;-V)N-1(Vj _bj)rj} 
Statement (14) has a preference interpreta- 
tion if we use a difference preference ap- 
proach, as in Sarin (1982). Note that the 
right-hand side of (14) is a decreasing func- 
tion of (u - v); that is, increasing (v - v) 
decreases the opportunity cost of any given 
bid deviation, b,* - bl. Thus, KR are mis- 
taken in thinking that the DKL and BKM 
experiments are responsive to Harrison's 
conjecture about low opportunity cost of bid 
deviations (or "flat maxima"). In fact, these 
experiments have by far the flattest maxima 
of all those being discussed in the present 
controversy and are contrary to Harrison's 
implication that flatter maxima increase de- 
viations from RNNE. 
KR's tables 2 and 3 report bid deviations 
and forgone expected income for median 
bidders and high bidders. The first thing to 
note about these tables is that the reported 
forgone-expected-income figures are incor- 
rect. This follows from the fact that these 
auctions were part of "dual-market" experi- 
ments in which a subject simultaneously en- 
ters bids in two or more markets and then 
coin flips or other random devices select 
one market for monetary payoff. KR explain 
why they did not report the actual expected- 
income figures in their footnote 12. This 
footnote states that tests show "...no sys- 
tematic behavioral difference under dual- 
market as compared to single-market pro- 
cedures in private-value auctions." That 
statement has an interesting implication that 
KR do not mention. All expected-income 
and expected-forgone-income figures are 
decreased substantially by introduction of 
the random market-selection procedure. If 
this has no effect on bidding behavior, then 
this provides a direct test which yields re- 
sults that are inconsistent with Harrison's 
conjecture. 
Another implication of the random selec- 
tion procedure is that the forgone- 
expected-income figures reported in KR's 
tables 2 and 3 are greatly overstated be- 
cause they do not reflect the market-selec- 
tion probabilities. Whatever one may think 
about the usefulness of such calculations, it 
is clear that any accurate comparison of 
expected-forgone-income figures across ex- 
periments must be based on the actual 
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probabilities that the monetary payoffs will 
be received. BKM (1990 p. 99) reported that 
the probability that one of their n = 5 dual 
markets would be selected for monetary 
payoff was 0.25. KR (1992 footnote 12) 
state that the dual-market approach was used 
in experiment A&M1, that it was not used 
in A&M2, and that it was used in some 
periods of A&M3. Therefore, the median 
forgone-expected-income figures in the 
fourth (A&M1) rows of KR's tables 2 and 3 
should be multiplied by 0.25; the figures in 
the fifth (A&M2) rows should not be 
changed; and the figures in the last (A&M3) 
rows should be adjusted by an unknown 
proportion. DKL (1989 p. 270) reported that 
in their experiments the high bidder would 
earn profits under only one of two bidding 
procedures, to be determined by a coin flip, 
after which one of two markets would be 
selected for monetary payoff by a second 
coin flip. Thus, the probability that any sub- 
ject's decision would have monetary payoff 
implications in a DKM experiment was 0.25. 
This implies that the median forgone- 
expected-income numbers in the first three 
rows of KR's tables 2 and 3 must be multi- 
plied by 0.25 to get the actual figures. Making 
these corrections yields the following figures 
in place of the ones reported in the first five 
rows of the median-forgone-income column 
of KR's table 2: 0.076,0.036, 0.059, 0.071, and 
0.045. These median expected-forgone- 
income figures are about the same as those 
reported by Harrison (1989 table 3) for his 
experiments; they are about 33 percent of the 
corresponding figures for the N = 4, A = 3 
experiments of CSW (1983a,b, 1984, 1985b, 
1988); and they are about 5 percent of the 
corresponding figures for the N = 4, A = 20 
experiments of Smith and Walker (1992a, b). 
Thus, the experiments used by KR have me- 
dian expected forgone incomes that are 
among the lowest of all those being discussed 
in the present controversy. 
KR claim that the numbers reported 
in their table 4 are inconsistent with 
CRRAM. In fact, there is nothing in their 
paper that supports that conclusion. The 
reason for this is that KR use an incorrect 
procedure in analyzing their data. Their 
analysis is based entirely on the use of a 
linear bid function (KR, 1992 footnote 15). 
However, their data include unedited obser- 
vations from the upper part of the bid func- 
tion. More importantly, their conclusions 
are about expected profits, corresponding to 
observed average profits, but KR have not 
carried out an expected-profit calculation. 
The simple formula that they use to analyze 
their data (see their footnote 15) has no 
valid implication for this question. Correct 
expected-profit calculations for these bid 
functions involve the use of order statistics, 
as explained in Cox, Roberson, and Smith 
(1982 pp. 12-13) and CSW (1985 pp. 184-8). 
KR (1992 p. 1388) concede that the tests 
they report in their table 4 "... are a bit 
informal..." and then continue by stating 
that "... more formal tests... yield the same 
result (Kagel and Levin, 1985)." Note that 
the "informal" tests in KR's table 4 are 
concerned with the effects of varying N, the 
number of bidders, on the ratio of observed 
to risk-neutral theoretical profits; but all of 
the experiments reported in Kagel and Levin 
(1985) are for N = 6. Thus, it is impossible 
for this claim about "more formal tests" to 
be true. 
KR (1992 p. 1387) claim that "evidence" 
is provided in Kagel and Levin (hereafter 
KL) (1985) and Kagel, Ronald M. Harstad, 
and Levin (hereafter KHL) (1987) that sub- 
jects act as if they are relatively more risk- 
averse when there are higher profits to be 
earned as a consequence of increasing VH 
(or, in our notation, v), the upper bound of 
the support from which the values of auc- 
tioned objects are drawn. We have not been 
able to find the "evidence" relating profits 
to relative risk aversion which they assert is 
in KL (1985) and KHL (1987). The only test 
results relating profits to relative risk aver- 
sion that we can find in KHL (1987) are 
those in their table VI. That table reports 
on tests that use data on the mean of 
the uniform distribution of values ("public 
information") to test the special case of 
CRRAM in which all bidders are assumed 
to have the same risk-aversion parameter. 
They refer to this special case as the "CRRA 
model" and state the following (KHL, 1987 
pp. 1293-4): "Comparing the predicted im- 
pact on revenue in Table VI with the risk- 
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neutral predictions in Table IV shows that 
the revenue-enhancing effects of public in- 
formation are sharply curtailed on the basis 
of the degree of risk aversion observed. In 
fact there is a slight difference, averaged 
across all auction periods, between the av- 
erage predicted revenue increase of 15 cents 
per auction period under the CRRA bid- 
ding model and the observed increase of 22 
cents per auction." This conclusion in KHL 
(1987) seems to be inconsistent with KR's 
assertions. We cannot find any other test 
results on relative risk aversion in KHL 
(1987). 
KL (1985) do present other test results on 
CRRAM. KL use data from the "public- 
information" periods of five out of the seven 
first-price auction experiments reported in 
KHL (1987). In all of these experiments, the 
number of bidders, N, equals six. The ex- 
perimental treatments within the public- 
information periods are random variation in 
vo, the mean of the value distribution, and 
time-trended variation in E, which is half 
the range of the support of the value distri- 
bution. Thus, the support [v, v] for the uni- 
form distribution of values can be written as 
[vo - ,, vo + e], and the linear part of the 
CRRAM bid function in equation (1) above 
can be rewritten as 
N-1 
(15) bj=vo-E+ N-1+ r (vj -vo + E). 
KL (1985) use ordinary least squares to esti- 
mate 
(16) bj = ao + 
alvj 
+ a2vo + a3E 
and then test the parameter restrictions im- 
plied by (15): a0 = O, a2 + a3 = O, a3 + 1- 
a1= 0. They report F-test results with a 
high percentage of the estimated parame- 
ters not satisfying the parameter restric- 
tions. 
There are two flaws in this KL (1985) test 
of CRRAM: (a) an incorrect application of 
bidding theory; and (b) a time-trended 
treatment variable in the experiments. We 
will explain both of these flaws. 
KL (1985) use three different assumptions 
about the relative risk-aversion parameter 
of the least risk-averse bidder in the popula- 
tion, i. An assumed value of r and the 
highest possible value, v0 + E, imply the 
amount of the highest bid that the (as- 
sumed) least risk-averse bidder will ever 
make, b*. KL then truncate their sample by 
deleting all observations such that v > b*. 
Thus, KL (1985) make the same mistake in 
testing CRRAM that KR (1992) do in dis- 
cussing it. See Subsection III-A, above, for 
an explanation of why this is an incorrect 
use of the data. 
The time-trended treatment variable in 
the experiments analyzed in KL (1985) and 
KHL (1987) creates serious problems for 
interpreting the data from these experi- 
ments. In some experiments, the subjects 
learn from experience and adjust their be- 
havior as the experiment is in progress. If 
different treatments are introduced during 
the experiments, their effects can be con- 
founded with learning and sequencing ef- 
fects. Experimentalists have devised various 
ways to deal with this potential problem, 
including the use of ABA designs (to see 
whether the subjects "return to baseline"), 
and inverting or randomizing treatment or- 
ders. None of these controls or checks for 
learning and sequencing effects were used 
in the experiments reported in KL (1985) 
and KHL (1987). This is a problem, because 
their key treatment variable 2E, the range of 
the value distribution, is time-trended. In 
two out of their seven first-price auction 
experiments, E weakly monotonically in- 
creases from 6 to 24 throughout the experi- 
ments. In the other five experiments, E 
weakly monotonically increases from 6 to 24 
during the first 22 or 23 periods and then 
drops to 12 in the last two periods. There 
are only two observations for each subject 
for the final E = 12 treatment level; hence it 
is not possible to test whether the subjects 
returned to baseline (bid the same as in the 
earlier E = 12 periods). This means that the 
effects of the E treatment are confounded 
with any learning and sequencing effects in 
these experiments. This produces serious 
interpretation problems. For example, when 
Cox and Oaxaca (1992) used the simple 
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check of introducing a time-trend variable 
(period number) into a KL (1985) regression 
equation, large numbers of subjects were 
transferred from the apparent CRRAM- 
inconsistent category to the CRRAM-con- 
sistent category.1" 
KR end their section III by asserting that 
the results of our (earlier) multiplicative- 
payoff experiments are not inconsistent with 
Harrison's (later) conjecture about low for- 
gone payoffs. The support they offer con- 
sists of (a) a claim that Harrison's critique 
postulates unspecified "uncontrolled fac- 
tors" that we did not vary (KR, 1992 
p. 1388) and (b) a story about a 300-pound 
gorilla who plays golf (KR, 1992 footnote 
16). First, Harrison (1989 pp. 751-4) did 
not put forth vague arguments about un- 
specified "uncontrolled factors"; instead, his 
critique is clearly about some specific mea- 
sures of forgone payoffs in experiments. In 
addition, the reader can easily see from our 
equation (10) above that our multiplicative- 
payoff experiments varied all increasing 
measures of forgone payoffs. Second, KR's 
interpretation of the gorilla story is not 
helpful for understanding scientific method. 
If one were to apply that interpretation in 
physics he would conclude that the famous 
Michaelson-Morley experiment is of little or 
no value in discriminating between ether 
theory and relativity theory because the lat- 
ter predicts no change in the experiment 
and none was observed.12 
We want to end by making sure that any 
readers who are unfamiliar with our papers 
are not misled by the last three paragraphs 
in KR's (1992) section III and the fourth 
paragraph in their section IV. All of that 
discussion is based on KR's (p. 1389) asser- 
tion that their informal tests of CRRAM, 
based on varying N and T (or VH), are 
"more demanding" than our tests based on 
multiplicative payoffs because the former 
"requires substantially greater adjustments 
in behavior to remain faithful to CRRAM." 
KR claim that the alleged difference be- 
tween their "more demanding" tests and 
our tests reflects "an important method- 
ological difference" (p. 1389). We are 
pleased that KR approve of tests based on 
varying N and u, since that was a principal 
focus of the first paper in our research 
program on auctions (Cox, Roberson, and 
Smith, 1982). That paper reports experi- 
ments in which N = 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9, and 
T = $4.90, $8.10, $12.10, $16.90, and $36.10. 
Furthermore, data from those (N, U) treat- 
ments, or other experimental treatments 
that require adjustments in behavior to re- 
main faithful to CRRAM, are used in tests 
reported in CSW (1984, 1985b, 1988) and in 
Walker et al. (1990). 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Harrison's (1989) metric approach to test- 
ing behavioral hypotheses involves an as- 
sumption of unique cardinal utility. Without 
unique cardinal utility, claims that mea- 
11Cox and Oaxaca (1992) explain that KL's experi- 
mental design for testing CRRAM is an unusual type 
of "boundary experiment" (Smith, 1982 p. 942). Ordi- 
narily, in testing an equilibrium theory, experimental- 
ists hold constant the demand, supply, or bid functions 
for several periods in order to give the subjects time to 
"find" the equilibrium. In contrast, KL shift the bid 
function (in bid-value space) every period through 
their random variation of v0 and time-trended varia- 
tion of e. This procedure maximizes the chances of 
observing disequilibrium "hysteresis effects" (Douglas 
Davis et al., 1991) in the experiments. KL's test then 
requires that the subjects respond such that the esti- 
mated parameters for v0 and - E are not significantly 
different from each other. 
12KR's gorilla story does not contain the salient 
characteristics of a bidding experiment. To see this, 
consider the following alternative. A gorilla will play T 
holes of golf. The fairway on which she plays each hole 
is randomly drawn, with replacement, from a popula- 
tion of fairways of different lengths. The expected mon- 
etary payoff to the gorilla is an increasing function of 
her accuracy in getting the ball close to the pin. There 
is a water trap in front of each green. If the ball lands 
in the water trap, the gorilla receives zero monetary 
payoff on that hole. The gorilla is observed consistently 
to adjust the length of her drive to varying fairway 
length. In addition, the gorilla consistently hits the ball 
farther than the distances that would maximize her 
expected monetary payoff. One model predicts that the 
gorilla will continue to use the same consistent strategy 
(of adapting her drive to varying fairway length) if 
monetary payoffs are tripled. Alternative models and 
conjectures predict that the gorilla's strategy will 
change. Monetary payoffs are tripled, and it is ob- 
served that the gorilla's strategy does not change. 
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sured utility differences are "too small" are 
arbitrary assertions. This is an empirical 
question, and Harrison has offered no ex- 
periments showing that increases in such 
differences cause decisions to move closer 
to RNNE predictions. Harrison's claim that 
experimental economists can induce sub- 
jects' utility functions in a way that supports 
valid statements based on a metric of for- 
gone utility is wrong, and his metrics do not 
provide useful heuristics to aid in experi- 
mental design because they do not measure 
forgone payoffs in informative ways. 
Both the Harrison critique and the Kagel 
and Roth (1992) comment create the im- 
pression that our research has not examined 
motivational questions. In fact, a major part 
of our research during the past decade has 
been directed to such questions. Here, we 
have described two of the approaches we 
have used. Our multiplicative-payoff experi- 
ments specifically addressed the "flat-max- 
imum" property discussed by Harrison. 
These experiments were reported in several 
of our articles, beginning in 1983. The em- 
pirical results are clearly inconsistent with 
Harrison's conjecture about risk-neutral 
bidding and flat maxima. Our formulation 
and testing of "income-threshold" and 
"utility-of-winning" (nonstandard) models 
of bidding behavior provide an internally 
consistent approach to studying motiva- 
tional questions. This contrasts with the in- 
ternally inconsistent approach that has been 
used by Harrison. 
Kagel and Roth insist that inconsistencies 
with theoretical predictions that result from 
introduction of the compound lotteries im- 
plied by the use of the binary lottery payoff 
technique must be interpreted as inconsis- 
tencies with "the risk-aversion hypothesis" 
rather than the compound-lottery axiom. 
What about the well-known predictive fail- 
ures of expected-utility theory in Allais- 
paradox, preference-reversal, and com- 
pound-lottery experiments (see e.g., Grether 
and Plott, 1979; Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky, 1979; Soo Hong Chew and 
William Waller, 1986; Cox and Seth Ep- 
stein, 1989; Camerer and Ho, 1990)? Must 
they all be interpreted as inconsistencies 
with "the risk-aversion hypothesis" by KR's 
reasoning? The fact is that some specific 
axiom (e.g., the compound-lottery axiom) 
can be of crucial importance in one context 
(e.g., lottery-payoff experiments) but of little 
importance in accurately predicting out- 
comes in another context. Kagel and Roth's 
assertion does not justify their ignoring the 
results from empirical tests of the reliability 
of the lottery payoff procedure. 
Kagel and Roth (p. 1389) state that 
"... the superior fit of the CRRAM model 
in first-price auctions results from its larger 
number of free parameters than the RNNE 
or homogeneous risk-aversion alternatives 
and thus does not directly test the core 
hypotheses of risk aversion and equilib- 
rium bidding." It is obvious that if the data 
are inconsistent with the RNNE or 
homogeneous-bidders risk-averse models 
then a more general model (perhaps one 
with "more free parameters") should be 
developed and tested. We did this when we 
introduced CRRAM and the log-concave 
model into the literature. After introducing 
the new models, we reported results from 
multiplicative-payoff experiments in which 
CRRAM predicts no change in behavior 
and all non-log-linear equilibrium bidding 
models predict that behavior will change. 
We also reported several experiments, in 
five of our papers, in which CRRAM pre- 
dicts that behavior will change in response 
to the experimental treatments (Cox, 
Roberson, and Smith, 1982; CSW, 1984, 
1985b, 1988; Walker et al., 1990). All of 
these tests are clearly direct tests of core 
hypotheses. 
Kagel and Roth (p. 1389) conclude that 
".. . .data from these same [DKL and BKM] 
experiments show that subjects act as if they 
are relatively more risk-averse when there 
are higher expected profits to be earned, 
which directly violates predictions based on 
the assumption of constant relative risk 
aversion underlying CRRAM." We have 
shown that Kagel and Roth's conclusion is 
wrong. First, correcting the figures reported 
in Kagel and Roth's tables 2 and 3 reveals 
that their data come from experiments with 
lower, not higher, expected profits 
than other experiments involved in the pre- 
sent controversy. Second, Kagel and Roth's 
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within-experiment calculations reported in 
their table 4 and footnote 15 are based on a 
simple formula that cannot support conclu- 
sions about expected profits in bidding ex- 
periments; correct analysis of data to draw 
conclusions about theoretical predictions of 
expected profits from bidding requires the 
use of order statistics, as explained in Cox, 
Roberson, and Smith (1982 pp. 12-13) and 
CSW (1985 pp. 184-8). Third, Kagel and 
Roth's conclusion is contradicted by the 
valid test results in Smith and Walker 
(1992b), in which a 20-fold increase in ex- 
pected payoffs (and expected forgone pay- 
offs) does not cause a significant increase in 
revealed subject risk aversion. 
Kagel and Roth maintain that their 
methodology and data analysis stand in 
sharp contrast with ours. This is correct, 
and we continue their discussion of the con- 
trast. They analyze only data that are pooled 
across individuals; hence, they cannot learn 
anything about individual decision-making 
characteristics relative to the predictions 
of theory. In contrast, we conduct both 
nonparametric and parametric tests on 
individual-subject data. They attribute devi- 
ations of pooled bids from RNNE to unde- 
fined "perceptual errors" (KR, 1992 p. 
1382) or "bidding errors ... of one sort or 
another" (p. 1384). In contrast, we have 
developed and tested models that predict 
deviations from RNNE in terms of risk 
aversion, utility (of the event) of winning, 
utility thresholds and decision costs. Kagel 
and Roth want us to reject auction theory 
because, as with all theories, there are 
anomalies. In contrast, we maintain, as does 
Lakatos (1980), that there is no falsification 
by negative evidence until we or others pro- 
vide substitute theories within a progressive 
research program. 
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